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"They that give up essential liberty to obtain a little temporary
safety deserve neither liberty nor safety."1
I. INTRODUCTION
In October 2001, President Bush signed the USA PATRIOT Act
(Patriot Act) into law.2 The legislation made broad changes to U.S.
intelligence efforts and statutes directed at terrorism. Many of the
changes were instigated by what was considered to be the inability of
the intelligence community to assess and address impending terrorist
threats in the months leading up to September 11, 2001. This was
* Faculty, Cornell University ILR School, International Human Rights Lecturer. This
article was written with exceptional assistance from Anita Hughes and Wynton Sharpe. It would
not have been possible without their intellectual heft, research prowess and research expertise.
1. BENJAMIN FRANKLIN (this quotation, slightly altered, is inscribed in a stairwell plaque
of the Statue of Liberty).
2. USA PATRIOT Act (Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate
Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism), Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (2001)
[hereinafter Patriot Act].
3. See The 9-11 COMM'N, FINAL REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON TERRORIST
ATTACKS UPON THE UNITED STATES, "THE SYSTEM WAS BLINKING RED," at 254 (2004).
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partially due to the legal restrictions prohibiting a free exchange of
information between agencies. The Patriot Act removed many of
those barriers and provided law enforcement agencies with new tools
to combat terrorism. The fundamental problem with those new tricks
and tools is that they fail to adequately take into account the constitu-
tional protections guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment. Whether it
was their zeal to respond to the largest attack on American soil in
history or it was simply a willful disregard of constitutional protections
in favor of greater government authority, Congress created problems
not previously contemplated in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.
This article will address those problems.
The first section will be a review of the Fourth Amendment. It will
follow the trajectory of searches and seizures from seventeenth cen-
tury England to post September 11th Fourth Amendment applica-
tions. This article will then turn to a review of the Patriot Act. It will
first consider the governmental interest in creating the Patriot Act, as
well as previous examples in American history, in which drastic mea-
sures were taken in response to perceived threats. The next section
will discuss the inherent difficulties with some of the sections of the
Patriot Act. Then, a Fourth Amendment analysis will be applied to
the problematic sections of the Patriot Act. Next, the article will pro-
vide predictions as to the long-term effects of leaving the Patriot Act
in tact. Finally, suggestions for correcting the problems created by the
Patriot Act are discussed.
II. THE FOURTH AMENDMENT: WHY THIS PROTECTION?
Implemented as a safeguard against the Writs of Assistance that
were commonplace in England, the Fourth Amendment protects indi-
viduals against "unreasonable searches and seizures" and warrants not
supported by "probable cause."4 Writs of Assistance were orders is-
sued under executive authority and "granted sweeping power to cus-
toms officials and other agents of the King to search at large for
smuggled goods." 5 The 1662 Act of Frauds authorized the use of
Writs of Assistance and legalized an authorized individual's ability to
"enter... any House ... or other Place, and in case of Resistance to
break open Doors, Chests, Trunks and other Package, there to seize,
and from thence to bring, any Kind of Goods or Merchandize [sic]
whatsoever, prohibited and uncustomed....
4. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
5. United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 8 (1977).
6. M.H. SMrrH, THE WRITS OF ASSISTANCE CASE 43 (Berkeley: University of California
Press 1978) (1761) (emphasis added).
2
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Although the text of the 1662 Act of Frauds allowed for the seizure
of prohibited and uncustomed items, the practice applied was to seize
anything the officer deemed prohibited, regardless of the customs sta-
tus or whether the items were the basis for the original entry. The
framers of the Constitution having endured these invasive practices at
the hands of the English government prior to the American Revolu-
tion had these very practices in mind when crafting the Fourth
Amendment. The Supreme Court case Boyd v. United States best il-
lustrates this statement. 8
In Boyd v. United States, the Court found a statute that allowed the
government to compel a suspect to produce personal effects to be un-
reasonable in violation of the Fourth Amendment.9 Under the statute
in question, if the suspect did not produce the papers, all allegations of
the government regarding the contents were considered admitted. 10
In its opinion, the Court referenced several debates and discussions
about the practice of Writs of Assistance in England. It stated that
the framers were mindful of the "struggles against arbitrary power in
which they had been engaged for more than twenty years. .. ."" Spe-
cifically, the Court did not believe men who had been subjected to
such capricious actions by the laws of England would then "approve
of such insidious disguises of the old grievance which they had so
deeply abhorred."'"
The concerns of the Court in Boyd are as real as they were then.
Fourth Amendment challenges have typically focused on two areas:
probable cause and reasonableness. Probable cause is that elusive
concept which is a prerequisite to a valid warrant. Reasonableness is
not only required for a search to be deemed valid, but also is the
Court's preferred analysis for a Fourth Amendment question. 3
A. Probable Cause
As recently as 2003, the Court described probable cause as "a fluid
concept... 'not readily, or even usefully, reduced to a neat set of legal
rules."'a Such a statement is not new to the Court's review of this
topic. In 1813, the Court explained that probable cause means "less
than evidence which would justify condemnation . . . ," and it simply
7. See id. at 44-46.
8. Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
9. Id.
10. Id. at 621.
11. Id. at 630.
12. Id.
13. See Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806 (1996); see also Ohio v. Robinette, 519 U.S. 33
(1996).
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stated that "combined circumstances" are used to make that determi-
nation. 15 The Court's decisions thus demonstrated the lack of a work-
able definition.
In Nathanson v. United States, the Court reversed the conviction of
an individual whose search warrant was granted based on the affidavit
that merely stated the officer's belief that contraband was on the de-
fendant's premises.' 6 The warrant affidavit was absent any explana-
tion for the officer's belief. The search was authorized under the
Tariff Act, which the Third Circuit said allowed for the issuance of
warrants based solely on suspicion.17 The Supreme Court, rejecting
that holding, stated that the Fourth Amendment prohibited warrants
issued on mere suspicion, and no act of Congress could allow what the
Constitution forbids. 8
Similarly, in Giordenello v. United States, the Court held probable
cause did not exist when a magistrate granted a warrant based on a
complaint that simply recited the elements of the crime but contained
nothing to support the officer's belief the defendant committed the
crime. 9 Additionally, the officer had no personal knowledge of the
crime. The Court stated that although a magistrate makes the deter-
mination of the "persuasiveness of the facts relied on by the com-
plaining officer . . ., [h]e should not accept without question the
complainant's mere conclusion that the person whose arrest is sought
has committed a crime. '"20
In contrast, in Jaben v. United States, the Court found a complaint
with minimal information was sufficient to satisfy the probable cause
requirement. 21 The defendant claimed the Tax Commissioner issued a
warrant based on a complaint that was as deficient as the one in Gior-
denello.22 In Jaben, the defendant was charged with tax evasion.23
The complaint contained allegations that the defendant filed false tax
returns, statements of the actual and reported income, as well as the
names of potential witnesses. 24 The Court distinguished the two com-
plaints. The Court began by dividing the allegations in a complaint
into two categories: "(1) that information which, if true, would directly
indicate commission of the crime charged, and (2) that which relates
15. Locke v. United States, 11 U.S. 339, 348 (1813).
16. Nathanson v. United States, 290 U.S. 41, 44 (1933).
17. Id. at 45-46.
18. Id. at 46-47.
19. Giordenello v. United States, 357 U.S. 480 (1958).
20. Id. at 486.
21. Jaben v. United States, 381 U.S. 214 (1965).
22. Id. at 222.
23. Id. at 216.
24. Id. at 221-22.
4
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to the source of the directly incriminating information. ' 25 In Gior-
denello, the complaint summarily discussed the former and was devoid
of the latter. In Jaben, the complaint contained information to
demonstrate the former and a statement that the swearing officer had
conducted an investigation to satisfy the latter.26
The Court surmised that the nature of some crimes lend themselves
more readily to simple factual allegations while others, like tax eva-
sion, require further investigation not required to establish probable
cause. 27 The crime of tax evasion requires the investigation of finan-
cial holdings, documents, and possible witnesses.28 The crime of nar-
cotics possession could be easily supported by witness statements, but
the warrant application in Giordenello did not provide any such infor-
mation, but merely stated there were individuals who may be wit-
nesses.29 The Court therefore concluded that a warrant application
"simply require[d] that enough information be presented to the Com-
missioner to enable him to make the judgment that the charges are
not capricious and are sufficiently supported to justify bringing into
play the further steps of the criminal process. '30
The test to determine probable cause is as imprecise as its defini-
tion. There is no bright-line standard for identifying probable cause.
Probable cause exists when "there is a fair probability that contraband
or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place. '3 How-
ever, a court can derive little guidance from that language. The analy-
sis is purely a case-by-case inquiry.
For a time, the Court applied a two-part test, specifically analyzing
the probable cause requirement under circumstances in which a war-
rant was sought based on an informant's tip. In Aguilar v. Texas, the
Court said such a warrant application should be supported by proof of
credibility and reliability of the informant.32 In Spinelli v. United
States, the warrant application included corroborated statements from
an informant as well as an FBI investigation that supposedly sup-
ported the informant's tip.3 3 The Court concluded that the inform-
ant's tip must survive the two-part test independent of the
corroborating statements. 34 The warrant application needed to in-
clude some explanation of the informant's knowledge. Otherwise, it




29. Giordenello, 357 U.S. at 481.
30. Jaben, 381 U.S. at 224.
31. Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238 (1983).
32. Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108, 114 (1964).
33. Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410, 413 (1969).
34. Id. at 417-18.
2006]
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would be indistinguishable from a police officer's statement of a sus-
pect's criminal activity without demonstration of the officer's
knowledge.35
In Illinois v. Gates, the Court moved away from the two-part test
and articulated "the totality of the circumstances" test for questions of
probable cause, which the Court felt was better suited to a Fourth
Amendment analysis. 36 The Illinois Supreme Court suppressed the
evidence obtained because the search warrant was granted on the ba-
sis of a "partially corroborated anonymous tip."'37 The police depart-
ment received a letter that alleged the defendants were drug dealers
and described some of their habits of traveling to and from Florida to
obtain drugs. The Illinois court based its decision on the fact that the
informant's tip did not meet the Aguilar-Spinelli two-part test.38
The United States Supreme Court agreed that the informant's tip
alone was not enough to demonstrate probable cause because the let-
ter contained no explanation as to how the informant came by his
information, nor could the police attest to the credibility of the in-
formant. 39 However, the Court said the information obtained by the
officer could supplement the tip "with information sufficient to permit
a determination of probable cause."4 The police officer applying for
the warrant confirmed some of the information in the informant's let-
ter with the assistance of a DEA agent.41 The Court reaffirmed its
position that probable cause is not subject to rigid standards because it
requires a determination based on probabilities not legal certainties.42
Therefore, the individual considering a warrant application should
consider all of the information to determine whether there is a "'sub-
stantial basis for ... conclud[ing]' that a search would uncover evi-
dence of wrongdoing, the Fourth Amendment requires no more. '43
The concept of probable cause has always been an elusive one and
no easy resolution exists. Varying circumstances and subjective im-
pressions make it impossible to establish a bright-line standard. With
such an imprecise standard, the Government should exercise great
caution when passing laws, such as the Patriot Act, that will rely heav-
ily on probable cause determinations. This is especially true when the
analysis for the other portion of a Fourth Amendment analysis, rea-
sonableness, is as imprecise as its probable cause counterpart.
35. Id. at 416-17.
36. Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1983).
37. Id. at 217.
38. Id. at 228-29.
39. Id. at 227.
40. Id. at 227-28.
41. Id. at 226.
42. Id. at 231.
43. Id. at 236 (quoting Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 271 (1960)).
6
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Reasonableness is the touchstone of Fourth Amendment analysis.4
The Fourth Amendment does not prevent all warrantless searches,
only unreasonable warrantless searches. The reasonableness of a
search balances the privacy interests of the individual on one hand
and the degree to which the search is necessary to promote a legiti-
mate government interest on the other.45 The stop and frisk practice
reviewed in Terry v. Ohio,4 6 is a primary example of the effective bal-
ancing of those two interests.
B. The Terry Doctrine
Terry v. Ohio established the validity of evidence obtained during a
"stop and frisk" even in the absence of probable cause.4 7 In Terry, a
police officer approached the defendant and his companion because
they "didn't look right to [him]."48 The men were standing on a cor-
ner at approximately two-thirty in the afternoon. The officer (dressed
in plain clothes) observed the men for several minutes and deter-
mined they were "casing" a nearby store.4 9 The officer approached
the men and questioned their activities. The men were evasive as to
their purpose for being in front of the store. The officer also sus-
pected that if the men were planning on robbing the store, they were
likely armed.5" The officer searched the men and found guns on both
men. During the search, the officer only patted down their outer gar-
ments and never placed his hand inside their clothes.51
The Court determined the evidence seized during the search was
admissible because the application of the exclusionary rule in such a
situation would not serve the purpose of protecting citizens from
"overbearing and harassing" police conduct.5" The Court noted the
wide range of occasions that give rise to interactions between police
officers and citizens. Some interactions are predicated by the officer's
desire to interrogate or arrest a suspect, but just as many are initiated
by innocuous contact that are in no way related to the desire to inves-
tigate a crime.53 Therefore, strict application of the exclusionary rule
to evidence seized during a stop and frisk because the tactic resembled
unconstitutional conduct would be to "exclude the products of legiti-
44. United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 118 (2001).
45. Id. at 119 (quoting Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 300 (1999)).
46. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
47. Id.
48. Id. at 5.
49. Id. at 6.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 15.
53. Id. at 13-14.
2006]
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mate police investigative techniques .... ,5' To avoid unnecessarily
excluding evidence which was obtained during a stop and frisk, the
Court outlined two questions to determine the reasonableness of a
law enforcement officer's actions: first, "whether the officer's action
was justified at its inception, and [second] whether it was reasonably
related in scope to the circumstances which justified the interference
in the first place. 55
The first part of the Terry two-part test focuses on the reasonable-
ness of the officer's suspicion. Reasonable suspicion is demonstrated
by the totality of the circumstances (similar to the analysis for proba-
ble cause). In assessing reasonable suspicion, officers may consider
circumstances such as unprovoked flight from the police, 56 the sus-
pect's presence in a high-crime area,57 information from an inform-
ant58 and nervous behavior of the suspect. 59
The second part of the Terry test focuses on the scope of the intru-
sion. The intrusion must be related to the suspicion that caused the
initial seizure. For instance, the officer in Terry believed the suspects
were armed; therefore, his scope of the intrusion was limited to a cur-
sory search of the suspects to dispel his suspicions.6 °
One of the challenges to the reasonableness of a Terry stop is the
length of the detention. In Terry, the stop consisted of several minutes
of questioning and a brief pat down of the suspects.6 However, not
every encounter is so brief. Are police then expected to forgo an in-
vestigation because a time limit lies in wait to label the investigation
unreasonable?
In United States v. Sharpe, the Court rejected the Fourth Circuit's
decision that a forty-minute detention of two suspects was unreasona-
ble thereby transforming the detention into a de facto arrest.62 A
DEA agent observed the suspects in Sharpe driving in tandem along a
highway during early morning hours. The agent also noticed that one
of the vehicles was riding low and did not bounce when it drove over
bumps in the road. This led the agent to believe the vehicle was possi-
bly overloaded with drugs.63
54. Id. at 13.
55. Id. at 20.
56. Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119 (2000).
57. Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143 (1972).
58. Id. The police officer knew the informant. The Court stated such an informant pro-
vides a stronger case for reasonable suspicion than would a telephone tip from an unknown
informant.
59. Maryland v. Wilson, 519 U.S. 408, 410-12 (1997).
60. Terry v. Ohio 392 U.S. 1, 19-20 (1968).
61. Id. at 6-7.
62. United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 683 (1985).
63. Id. at 677.
8
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The agent observed the suspects for twenty miles then decided to
make an investigatory stop. He contacted the state law enforcement
officials for assistance. Shortly after the state trooper arrived, he sig-
naled the cars to pull over. One of the drivers complied; the driver of
the overloaded vehicle drove away in an attempt to escape. The agent
pulled over behind the stopped car, called for additional assistance,
and obtained the identification of the driver while he waited. The
state trooper followed and subsequently apprehended the fleeing ve-
hicle. When the additional patrol cars arrived, the agent left to assist
the trooper with the fleeing vehicle.64
The identification of one driver and the registration of the other
vehicle bore the same name, and this further aroused the suspicion of
the agent. During a cursory search of the outside of the second vehi-
cle, the agent detected the odor of marijuana. A search of the vehicle
uncovered several bags of marijuana. Both suspects were detained
during the apprehension and search of the second vehicle.65
The Court distinguished the facts of Sharpe from cases where it
found lengthy detentions to be unreasonable. First, the Court consid-
ered Dunaway v. New York, in which a murder suspect was picked up
by police and driven to the police station where he was interrogated
for an hour before confessing to the crime.66 Second, in United States
v. Place, DEA agents detained a suspect in an airport for ninety min-
utes while they transported his seized luggage to a narcotics dog for a
sniff test.67
The unreasonableness of the detentions in these cases was not
based on the length of the detention but in the events occurring dur-
ing the detention.68 The officers in Dunaway had no probable cause
to obtain a warrant against the suspect and the suspect did not accom-
pany the police willingly, so the interrogation resulted from an illegal
seizure. 69 In Place, the Court reasoned that the agents' foreknowl-
edge of the suspect's arrival at the airport several hours before the
encounter provided ample time to have the narcotics dog readily
available rather than forcing the suspect to wait for ninety minutes.
70
In Sharpe, however, the lengthy detention was not the officers'
fault. It was due to the co-defendant's attempt to elude the officers,
which caused them to separate.71 The Court reasoned that were it not
64. Id. at 678.
65. Id.
66. Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200 (1979).
67. United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696 (1983).
68. Sharpe, 470 U.S. at 684.
69. Dunaway, 442 U.S. at 212-13.
70. Place, 462 U.S. at 709.
71. Sharpe, 470 U.S. at 687.
20061
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for those evasive acts, the detention would have been brief and keep-
ing with the standards established in Terry.7 2 The Court concluded
that when considering the reasonableness of the length of a suspect's
detention, the question must not be merely how long the suspect was
detained but whether the police acted diligently to pursue their inves-
tigation allowed within the scope of Terry.7 3
C. The Fourth Amendment since September 11, 2001
Since September 11, 2001, the Supreme Court has heard nineteen
cases that raised a Fourth Amendment question.74 The Court upheld
the constitutionality of the challenged searches in fifteen of those
cases.75 The cases in which the Court found the searches to be consti-
tutional include challenges to an anticipatory search warrant,76 the use
of a drug sniffing dog around the outside of a legally stopped vehi-
cle,77 and the forced entry into a residence mere seconds after police
officers announced their presence.78 Of the four instances in which
the Court found the challenged actions to be unconstitutional, three
involved residential searches,79 and the fourth involved the illegal
seizure of an individual from his home in the middle of the night.8 °
In one of the four aforementioned cases regarding unconstitutional
searches, the search involved a warrant that did not include the specif-
ics of the items to be searched.8" The affidavit submitted in support of
72. Id. at 688.
73. Id. at 686.
74. See Georgia v. Randolph, 126 S. Ct. 1515 (2006); United States v. Grubbs, 126 S. Ct.
1494 (2006); Meuhler v. Mena 544 U.S. 93 (2005); Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405 (2005);
Devenpeck v. Alford, 543 U.S. 146 (2004); Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial Dist. Ct., 542 U.S. 177 (2004);
Thornton v. United States, 541 U.S. 615 (2004); United States v. Flores-Montano, 541 U.S. 149;
Groh v. Ramirez, 540 U.S. 551 (2004); Illinois v. Lidster, 540 U.S. 419 (2004); United States v.
Banks, 540 U.S. 31 (2003); Inyo County v. Paiute-Shoshone Indians of the Bishop Cmty., 538
U.S. 701 (2003); Kaupp v. Texas, 538 U.S. 626 (2003); Bd. of Educ. v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822 (2002);
Kirk v. Louisiana, 536 U.S. 635 (2002); United States v. Drayton, 536 U.S. 194 (2002); Unites
States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266 (2002); United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112 (2001); Overton v.
Ohio, 534 U.S. 982 (2001).
75. See United States v. Grubbs, 126 S. Ct. 1494 (2006); Meuhler v. Mena 544 U.S. 93
(2005); Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405 (2005); Devenpeck v. Afford, 543 U.S. 146 (2004); Hiibel
v. Sixth Judicial Dist. Ct., 542 U.S. 177 (2004); Thornton v. United States, 541 U.S. 615 (2004);
United States v. Flores-Montano, 541 U.S. 149; Illinois v. Lidster, 540 U.S. 419 (2004); United
States v. Banks, 540 U.S. 31 (2003); Inyo County v. Paiute-Shoshone Indians of the Bishop
Cmty., 538 U.S. 701 (2003); Kaupp v. Texas, 538 U.S. 626 (2003); Bd. of Educ. v. Earls, 536 U.S.
822 (2002); United States v. Drayton, 536 U.S. 194 (2002); Unites States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266
(2002); United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112 (2001).
76. United States v. Grubbs, 126 S. Ct. 1494 (2006).
77. Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405 (2005).
78. United States v. Banks, 540 U.S. 31 (2003).
79. Georgia v. Randolph, 126 S. Ct. 1515 (2006); Groh v. Ramirez, 540 U.S. 551 (2004);
Kirk v. Louisiana, 536 U.S. 635 (2002).
80. Kaupp v. Texas, 538 U.S. 626 (2003).
81. Groh v. Ramirez, 540 U.S. 551 (2004).
10
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the warrant application included the information, but the warrant did
not incorporate the affidavit.82 The Court said the warrant was
facially invalid; therefore, the search was unreasonable. 83 That unrea-
sonableness was not cured by the fact that the officers orally notified
the defendants of the items to be searched nor could it be cured by the
fact that the officers limited their search to those items that were in-
cluded in the affidavit.84
An interesting consideration is a case in which the Court denied
certiorari and did not grant a reversal. In October 2001, the Court
denied certiorari on a decision from the Ohio Supreme Court that
appeared to be in direct contradiction to the Court's opinion in Gior-
denello. In Overton v. Ohio, the defendant challenged a search war-
rant granted based on an officer's affidavit that included the following
information:
The defendant, being the owner, lessee, or occupant of certain prem-
ises, did knowingly permit such premises to be used for the commis-
sion of a felony drug abuse offense, to-wit: Desarie Overton being the
lessee, owner, or occupant of 620 Belmont, Toledo, Ohio 43607, know-
ingly permitted Cocaine, a Schedule Two controlled substance to be
sold and possessed by the occupants, there, both being in violation of
the Ohio Revised Code, a felony drug abuse offense. This offense oc-
curred in Toledo, Lucas County, Ohio.85
The officer did not make any statements as to how or why he believed
the defendant committed the crimes charged.86
The Ohio Supreme Court determined the officer had probable
cause to obtain the warrant because the complaint contained both a
"specific code section" and "specific factual" information sworn to by
a fellow detective, and the officer recognized the defendant when he
arrived to serve the warrant due to previous encounters with her.87
The Ohio court did not say what "specific factual information" was
present nor did it indicate how listing a "specific code section" in any
way demonstrated probable cause. Additionally, the officer's famili-
arity with the defendant should only have been relevant if it supported
his belief of the defendant's commission of the crime, which was not
the claim. Although the Supreme Court denied certiorari, four Jus-
tices joined in a dissent regarding that denial. The dissenters believed
82. Id.
83. Id. at 557.
84. Id. at 558, 560.
85. Overton v. Ohio, 534 U.S. 982, 983-84 (2001).
86. Id. at 984.
87. State v. Overton, No. L-99-1317, 2000 Ohio App. LEXIS 3919 (Ohio Ct. App. 2000),
cert. denied, Overton v. Ohio, 534 U.S. 982 (2001).
20061
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that since the case clearly contradicted precedent, the Court should
have summarily reversed the decision.88
The cases in which the Court rejected a Fourth Amendment chal-
lenge grant more liberty to law enforcement officials. For instance, in
Illinois v. Lidster, the Court upheld the constitutionality of a highway
checkpoint established to obtain information regarding a hit-and-run
suspect.89 The police arrested the defendant in Lidster for driving
under the influence of alcohol after swerving and nearly hitting a po-
lice officer at a highway checkpoint. The defendant argued that the
police obtained evidence of his insobriety primarily because of the ex-
istence of the checkpoint, which he claimed was unconstitutional.9 °
The police used the checkpoint in Lidster to gather information
about a fatal hit-and-run accident. The accident occurred a week ear-
lier. In an effort to find witnesses, the police partially blocked a high-
way, stopped passing cars, questioned the occupants for fifteen to
twenty seconds, provided each driver with a flyer that described the
accident, and requested anyone with information to contact the
proper authorities.91
The Court focused on the reasonableness of the stop in its opin-
ion.92 The factors relevant to that question are "the gravity of the
public concerns served by the seizure, the degree to which the seizure
advances the public interest, and the severity of the interference with
individual liberty."93 The three brief paragraphs the Court used to
analyze these factors show no clear distinction from cases where the
Court found a checkpoint to be unconstitutional. This suggests the
Court had a particular outcome in mind when it penned the opinion
and glossed over the analysis to suit its purpose.
The Court said the investigation of a human death is of grave public
concern.94 The Court pointed to the fact that the investigation pur-
sued the police at the checkpoint included questions that were di-
rected toward solving a specific crime rather than toward general
crime control.95 A checkpoint that hopes to identify criminals versus
88. Overton v. Ohio, 534 U.S. 982, 986 (2001).
89. Illinois v. Lidster, 540 U.S. 419 (2004).
90. Id. at 422.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 427.
93. Id.
94. Id. But see City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 42 (2000) (the gravity of illegal
narcotics trafficking was insufficient to justify the established checkpoint).
95. Lidster, 540 U.S. at 427. The Court compared the facts in Lidster to those in City of
Indianapolis v. Edmond, in which the police set a checkpoint as part of a drug interdiction.
Edmond, 531 U.S. at 32 (2000). In Edmond, the police stopped a predetermined number of
vehicles, requested the driver's identification and registration information, did an open-view in-
spection of the vehicle and walked a drug-sniffing dog around the exterior of the vehicle. Ed-
mond, 531 U.S. at 34-35. The Court found the checkpoints in Edmond to be unconstitutional
12
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a checkpoint that hopes to identify witnesses bears no critical differ-
ences. Specifically, police are not assured that one vehicle over an-
other will more likely to produce the desired result. Also, curiously
absent from the Court's analysis was any notion of exigency consistent
with prior opinions.96 The crime in Lidster occurred a week prior to
the police establishing the checkpoint, and there was no indication the
hit-and-run driver had struck or was likely to strike again, thereby
generating a pressing need to locate the suspect.
Next, the Court held, "[t]he stop advanced this grave public concern
to a significant degree."97 The police department's "appropriately tai-
lored" checkpoint was relevant to the investigation.98 The Court
noted the police department's belief that the checkpoint might pro-
duce witnesses because workers from a local industrial park might
have been in the vicinity of the crime the night it occurred. 99 How-
ever, the Court did not consider whether this was a valid assump-
tion.1°° Additionally, the Court did not provide an example of what
type of police action may not have advanced the public concern.
Finally, the Court said the brevity of the detention was the most
important factor in its determination.1 ' The stop required drivers to
wait a few minutes and have a brief conversation with police. While
there is no disputing that the interaction with the police was brief, in
none of its previous decisions did the Court indicate the brevity of the
interference was the most important factor.'0 2
because there was no "individualized suspicion" present that instigated the stops. Edmond, 531
U.S. at 44.
96. See Mich. Dep't of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444 (1990), recognizing the immediate
need to remove drunk drivers from the road. Id. at 451. See also City of Indianapolis v. Ed-
mond, 531 U.S. 32, 44 (2000) (hypothesizing that "thwarting an imminent terrorist attack" or
apprehending a "dangerous criminal who is likely to flee by a particular route" would justify a
checkpoint that would otherwise relate to ordinary crime control).
97. Lidster, 540 U.S. at 427.
98. Id. The police set up the checkpoint about a week after the accident, near the location of
the accident, at around the same time of day as the accident.
99. Id.
100. In Mich. Dep't of State Police v. Sitz, the Court considered statistical data regarding the
amount of damage caused by drunk drivers, as well as the number of drunk drivers likely to be
caught by the checkpoint when validating the drunk driver checkpoint established in that case.
496 U.S. 444, 451, 455 (1990). In Lidster, however, the police did not demonstrate how efficient
the checkpoint was at reaching the targeted pool of potential witnesses.
101. Lidster, 540 U.S. at 427.
102. See City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 35 (2000) (giving little weight to the
fact that the stop was only two to three minutes long when finding an illegal narcotics checkpoint
unconstitutional); Mich. Dep't of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444 (1990) (discussing for the bulk
of the opinion, the gravity of public concern in regards to drunk drivers and the relevant effec-
tiveness of the checkpoints in apprehending offenders - with relevant statistical data to support
the observations); United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543 (1976) (stating in passing that
brief detentions are allowable but spent the majority of its analysis reviewing the relevant effec-
tiveness of border checkpoints to curbing illegal aliens from entering the country).
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A recent decision sure to attract a substantial amount of attention is
the case in which the Court upheld a stop and identify statute. 10 3 In
Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial District Court, the Court held that a Nevada
statute requiring the defendant to identify himself to a police officer
was constitutional because the officer had reasonable suspicion for the
initial stop (as required by Terry), and the request for identification
was a "commonsense inquiry" in light of the circumstances. °4
In Hiibel, an officer responding to a report of an assault approached
the defendant and explained he was investigating the report. The de-
fendant was parked alongside the road when the officer approached.
The defendant appeared intoxicated so the officer asked him for iden-
tification. The defendant refused to provide identification and de-
manded to know why the officer wanted it. The officer again told the
defendant he was investigating an assault complaint. The exchange
continued for several minutes; the officer made eleven requests for
the defendant's identification. The officer made a final request for the
defendant's identification and warned the defendant that failure to
comply would result in his arrest. The defendant refused and was
arrested.1
0 5
The Court identified the true question as being whether the Fourth
Amendment prohibits the arrest and prosecution of an individual for
failure to answer questions regarding his identity under Nevada state
law. 10 6 The Court stated that previous cases demonstrate that inquir-
ies concerning a person's identity are a routine part of a Terry stop.
0 7
However, the Court was careful to reject statements in earlier opin-
ions that suggest the Fourth Amendment establishes a right to refuse
to answer questions during a Terry stop.1" 8
The Court recognized that the concurrence in Terry stated that sub-
jects of a Terry stop cannot be compelled to answer questions, and
that a refusal to answer questions cannot be the basis for an arrest. 10 9
Yet, the Court concluded that while the Fourth Amendment does not
compel an individual to provide information to the police, a state stat-
ute might do so as long as it complies with the requirements of reason-
ableness established in Terry. ° The Court suggested that if an officer
can inquire as to a person's identity, but has no authority to respond
to a refusal, the authority to make the request becomes a legal nul-
103. Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial Dist. Ct., 542 U.S. 177 (2004).
104. Id. at 188-89.
105. Id. at 180-81.
106. Id. at 186-87.
107. Id. at 186. (citing United States v. Hensley, 469 U.S. 221, 229 (1985); Hayes v. Florida,
470 U.S. 811, 816 (1985); Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 146 (1972)).
108. Id. at 187.
109. Id. (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 34 (1968) (White, J., concurring)).
110. Id. at 187-89.
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lity.111 Conversely, if a question is not reasonably related to the pur-
pose of the initial stop, it is unreasonable, and a subsequent arrest
based on the refusal to answer is invalid.112 The conclusion in Hiibel
allowing a state to require a suspect to disclose his name during the
course of a Terry stop has instigated a barrage of articles which claim
that a slippery slope to the total erosion of Fourth Amendment rights
has begun. 1 3
III. THE PATRIOT ACT: THE APPEARANCE OF "PROTECTION"
On October 23, 2001, barely a month and a half after the September
11th attacks, the Patriot Act was introduced in the House of Repre-
sentatives. 1 4 Less than seventy-two hours later, the President signed
the bill into law. The Patriot Act was the third piece of anti-terrorism
legislation presented in Congress after the September 11th attacks.115
The sweeping legislation brought much of the nation's intelligence
community under the purview of the Justice Department. In consider-
ing and passing the law, Congress gave little credence to the long-term
effects the Patriot Act would have on Fourth Amendment protec-
tions.' 16 Constitutional scholars and civil rights groups were fearful of
the far-reaching, liberal and largely unchecked liberties granted to law
enforcement officials under the Patriot Act. However, most Ameri-
cans were so fearful of another terrorist attack that they were happy
for the "security" regardless of whether it would actually help combat
terrorism or require that citizens relinquish Constitutional protec-
tions. Congress's efforts resulted in a hastily drafted, vague piece of
legislation that allows law enforcement officials to overstep Constitu-
tional limitations with impunity.
Though the timeframe to draft the Patriot Act was limited, the
breadth of the Patriot Act is not. The Patriot Act traded constitu-
tional protection for a false sense of security and a vast majority of the
American people willingly complied. The Patriot Act, which was over
111. Id. at 188.
112. Id.
113. See Jamie L. Stulin, Comment, Does Hiibel Redefine Terry? The Latest Expansion Of
The Terry Doctrine And The Silent Impact Of Terrorism On The Supreme Court's Decision To
Compel Identification, 54 AM. U.L. REV. 1449 (2005); Arnold H. Loewy, Article, The Cowboy
And The Cop: The Saga Of Dudley Hiibel, 9/11, And The Vanishing Fourth Amendment, 109
PENN ST. L. REV. 929 (2005); William R. Snyder, Jr., Case Comment, Slipping Down The Slope
Of Probable Cause: An Unreasonable Exception To What Was Once A Reasonable Rule: Hiibel v.
Sixth Jud. Dist. Ct., 124 S. Ct. 2451 (2004), 57 FLA. L. REV. 445 (2005).
114. Supra note 2.
115. Provide Appropriate Tools Required To Intercept And Obstruct Terrorism (Patriot)
Act of 2001, H.R. 2975, 107th Cong. (2001); International Money Laundering Abatement and
Anti-Terrorist Financing Act of 2001, S. 1511, 107th Cong. (2001). Both of these legislative items
were ultimately incorporated into the Patriot Act.
116. See 147 Cong. Rec. S10990-02 (2001) (statements of Sen. Leahy).
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300 pages in length, affected nearly a dozen government agencies and
revised no less than 100 federal statutes. 17 The Patriot Act grants the
following powers: authority to intercept wire, oral, and electronic
communications, and to delay notice of the execution of a warrant.
1 1 8
In effect, the Patriot Act reaches the disclosure of financial transac-
tions information,119 DNA evidence cataloging and reporting,
20
changing wiretapping application procedures,1 2 1 and assessing com-
pensation for victims of terrorist acts. 2 2
Two things happen in a time of war. First, the power of the Execu-
tive branch increases as it seeks to preserve its own interests. Second,
citizens have the opportunity to see the true nature of their govern-
ment as its interests subsume their own. There is often tension be-
tween these two entities. 23  The framers of the Constitution
recognized that tension. That tension is simply more pronounced dur-
ing a time of conflict.
A. Governmental Interests
On the side of the government, there exists an independent desire
to promulgate its ideas and to survive, and it will take whatever ac-
tions it deems necessary to do so. The events of September 11th chal-
lenged the United States government as never before. The images of
lawmakers in front of the Capitol singing "God Bless America" was as
much an act of government self-preservation as it was one of patriot-
ism. As such, there exists the need to protect the individual from the
government because the government has its own mandates. Those
mandates reach further than any individual who may infringe on per-
sonal liberties. The Patriot Act, coupled with new technology, pro-
vides the government with a greater ability to achieve its goals
through intrusion into the private sphere. Many Americans seem un-
concerned about this startling development.
Is it possible that the government responds differently to protecting
individual rights, or is the Patriot Act simply a protection of the gov-
ernment's ideology of the American way of life? When viewed as a
whole, the Patriot Act does not improve the day-to-day safety of any
American. It does do a good job of protecting the American way of
117. See generally Patriot Act § 207 (expanding timeframes for surveillance), § 214 (email
and wiretaps), §§ 201-202 (expanding scope of wiretapping act), §§ 209-210 (voicemail, Internet
and telephone), and § 213 (revising "Knock and Announce" warrant notification).
118. Patriot Act §§ 201, 213 (2001) (amending 50 U.S.C. § 1805, 50 U.S.C. § 1824(d)(1)
(2006)).
119. §§ 301-377.
120. § 503 (amending 42 U.S.C. § 14135A (2006)).
121. § 207 (amending 50 U.S.C. § 1805 (2006)).
122. § 624 (amending 42 U.S.C. § 10603 (2006)).
123. See generally Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 529 (2004).
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life because now what you say and to whom you say it can be secretly
monitored, and if either is contrary to traditional American values, an
individual could find himself jailed for suspicion of terrorism. Tension
always exists between government ideology and individuals' rights to
espouse their thoughts on that ideology. Traditionally, an opposing
ideology from outside of our borders was given greater scrutiny. Now,
with the passage of the Patriot Act, Americans face the same level of
scrutiny as known terrorist groups.
The reason Congress enacted the Patriot Act so quickly was the
perceived imminent danger of another attack that could be detected
and prevented more readily by police agencies with open lines of com-
munication. While the desire to improve the functions among the fed-
eral police agencies is a laudable goal, it is unnecessary to concentrate
so much police power to accomplish that goal. It seems that if this was
the case there would be more focus on communication between police
organizations, which were the inefficiencies that allowed the 9/11 at-
tackers to remain here so long to train for the mission. Yet, there is
nothing in the Patriot Act that directly addresses these problems.
The Patriot Act is not the first hasty reaction to a domestic threat.
The government's response is consistent when faced with the peril of
war or the possibility of a significant change in the American way of
life. As a general rule, that response means that the flag of fear is
raised, the people are cautioned of the impending doom, and individ-
ual rights are thrust aside.
Likely, the most controversial of government actions prior to the
Patriot Act occurred during World War II when Japanese living in the
United States were required to live under imposed curfews or in relo-
cation camps because of forced exclusion from their homes. In Hira-
bayashi v. United States12 4and in Korematsu v. United States,125 the
Supreme Court considered challenges to those government actions.
The government claimed the action was necessary to prevent future
attacks against U.S. interests.1 6 The Court recognized the highly sus-
pect nature of the orders because they were directed at a particular
racial group. Regardless, the Court upheld the actions. The Court
was more concerned with the safety of American citizens as a whole
than it was with the intrusions into the liberties of the affected individ-
uals. The Court demonstrated this by stating, "When under condi-
tions of modern warfare our shores are threatened by hostile forces,
124. Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81 (1943).
125. Korernatsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
126. Hirabayashi, 320 U.S. at 86-87.
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the power to protect must be commensurate with the threatened
danger.' 12
7
During the Vietnam Era, the government used surveillance as a
prophylactic measure against the internal threats that appeared in the
form of the ideology of anti-war demonstrators, the resurgence of so-
cialist thought, and the radical civil rights groups. 128 There was no
external threat and no real threat of any large-scale attacks. However,
the government feared an ideological shift in the body politic and re-
sponded by infringing upon rights of association and labeling individu-
als and political groups as subversive.
The expendability of rights is more than a government contrivance.
Americans have been willing to relinquish their individual rights (1) in
response to fear, or (2) when the government has been able to con-
vince Americans that it is in their best interest to forgo their liberties
in lieu of their safety. For instance, in response to heightened gang
activity and resulting violence, the citizens of Chicago, Illinois passed
a local ordinance, which made it a crime for individuals to continue
loitering after a police officer ordered them to disperse. The ordi-
nance was challenged in Chicago v. Morales.1 29 Although the Court
struck down the ordinance for vagueness, Justice Scalia's dissent
touted the ability of citizens to relinquish their rights willingly in favor
of safety and freedom from an unwanted criminal element. 3 ° How-
ever, he was careful to note that citizens should not sacrifice constitu-
tional protections for the sake of safety. 1 3 1 Furthermore, the citizens
in Morales made their decision based on what they saw in their daily
lives. It was not a reaction to a single, albeit horrific, event.
The obvious difference between the above examples and the Patriot
Act is that the American people had never seen such a large scale
attack on a non-military target such as the events of September 11th.
There is no way to diminish the realities of the horrors of September
11th, nor is that the intention. However, a piece of legislation that
offers no more protection for daily living than existed prior to Sep-
tember 11th cannot alleviate the fear experienced by every American
who witnessed the attacks and its subsequent results.
Americans are willing to forgo their rights during wartime, but
there is a quiet expectation that once the threat has subsided, homeo-
127. Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 220.
128. See generally Socialist Workers Party v. Attorney General, 419 U.S. 1314 (1974).
129. Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 47 (1999).
130. Id. at 98 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("The citizens of Chicago have decided that depriving
themselves of the freedom to "hang out" with a gang member is necessary to eliminate pervasive
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stasis returns. 3 ' While there is a line of reasoning that the war on
terrorism is an ongoing one, because of the very nature of this war and
its duration, our government should exercise greater care in passing
laws that affect constitutionally protected rights. Congress must con-
sider that laws in response to a continuous threat have the potential to
become firmly entrenched in our criminal justice system. Therefore,
such laws should be focused and temporary. The Patriot Act is
neither. It is not a routine response during a time of turmoil. This
particular piece of legislation subverts checks and balances, ignores
constitutional conflicts, and assumes a permanent place in American
law.
B. Problems with the Patriot Act
One result of the speed with which the Patriot Act was drafted is
the vagueness of many of its sections and provisions. The lack of spec-
ificity and particularity means necessarily that there is a greater likeli-
hood of abuse by law enforcement officials who will undoubtedly
interpret the text in the manner that gives them the most leeway.
Courts will compound the abuse by giving deference to officers who
must often make split-second decisions to execute ambiguous
duties.133
The Patriot Act expanded 18 U.S.C. § 2339A, which makes provid-
ing material support to terrorists and terrorists organizations a
crime. 34 Whereas the statute previously required the support of ter-
rorist activity to occur within the United States, the Patriot Act elimi-
nated that requirement. Now material support provided to any
terrorist, anywhere, is prosecutable under the statute. Two problems
exist in regards to this edict. First, what qualifies as material support
and, second, what level of intent is required to demonstrate that
support?
The statute defines material support as:
[A]ny property, tangible or intangible, or service, including currency
or monetary instruments or financial securities, financial services,
lodging, training, expert advice or assistance, safehouses, false docu-
mentation or identification, communications equipment, facilities,
132. See generally William J. Stuntz, Local Policing After Terror, 111 YALE L.J. 2137 (2002)
(stating that after September 11th heightened police powers should continue "at least for a
while"). Id. at 2138.
133. See Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396-97 (1989) ("The calculus of reasonable-
ness must embody allowance for the fact that police officers are often forced to make split-
second judgments - in circumstances that are tense, uncertain, and rapidly evolving - about
the amount of force that is necessary in a particular situation."). See also Brinegar v. United
States, 338 U.S. 160, 167 (1949) (stating that police officers must be allowed "room ... for some
mistakes" because their duties are "more or less ambiguous..
134. Patriot Act § 805 (2001).
2006]
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weapons, lethal substances, explosives, personnel (1 or more individu-
als who may be or include oneself), and transportation, except
medicine or religious materials[.] 135
While several of the items are easily identified (e.g. explosives, lethal
substances and weapons), just as many are not as easily explained (e.g.
service, facilities and personnel). The statute does not provide any
guidance other than to say that personnel may be one or more people.
The statute also does not indicate the required nexus between (1)
the material support, (2) the terrorist, and (3) the activity.136 In Boim
v. Quranic Literacy Institute, the Seventh Circuit clearly rejected the
notion that material support requires a close connection between the
support provided and the terrorist activity.137 In Boim, there was a
three-year gap between the financial support and the terrorist act.138
However, in Singh-Kaur v. Ashcroft, the Third Circuit said that for
support to be material, it must be significant or essential and have a
logical connection with the terrorist activity.139 Although the defen-
dant in Singh-Kaur was charged under an immigration statute, the lan-
guage regarding material support is substantially similar to section
2339A.' 4 °
In Boim, the court of appeals also corrected the district court's erro-
neous statement that "the term 'material' in the context of sections
2339A and 2339B . . . mean[s] substantial or considerable. 1 4 ' Ac-
cording to the circuit court, "the term relates to the type of aid pro-
vided rather than whether it is substantial or considerable." ' The
Seventh Circuit's rationale was that Congress's efforts to combat ter-
rorism would be hindered greatly if liability could be avoided by the
pooling of small donations. 43
Section 213 of the Patriot Act expands the circumstances under
which providing notice of the execution of a warrant may be
delayed.' 44 The section amends 18 U.S.C. § 3103a to specifically allow
for delay in providing notice if there is reasonable cause to believe
providing notice would have an adverse result.145 Again, the problem
is two-fold. First, under the reasonable cause standard established in
135. 18 U.S.C § 2339A(b)(1).
136. See In re Terrorist Attacks on September 11, 2001, 392 F. Supp. 2d 539, 567 (D.N.Y.
2005) (A satellite phone battery that was used in a phone when ordering terrorist attacks was
sufficient to establish material support).
137. Boim v. Quranic Literacy Inst., 291 F.3d 1000, 1015 (7th Cir. 2002).
138. Boim v. Quranic Literacy Inst., 127 F. Supp. 2d 1002, 1019 (D. Ill. 2001).
139. Singh-Kaur v. Ashcroft, 385 F.3d 293, 298 (3d Cir. 2004).
140. See 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(B)(iv)(VI) (2006).
141. Boim, 291 F.3d at 1015.
142. Id. (emphasis added).
143. Id.
144. See Patriot Act § 213.
145. See id.
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the Patriot Act, it is difficult to imagine a situation in which it would
not be reasonable to delay notice when the focus of the search is to
obtain evidence of suspected terrorism. The very nature of terrorism
requires the government to be as discreet as possible in its investiga-
tion so as not to alert a would-be terrorist which would spur him into
action or alert him of the investigation and hasten his escape. 46
Second, even if permission to delay notice is denied by the magis-
trate at the time the warrant is issued, the executing officers may still
withhold notice. Based on the Supreme Court's reasoning in Richards
v. Wisconsin, the time when it is most appropriate to determine if no-
tice is required is at the time of the execution of the warrant.14 7 Of-
ficers are allowed to judge the circumstances independent of the
magistrate's objective decision. The executing officer need only rea-
sonably believe the circumstances negate the need for notice.148 Since
reasonable belief is such a low threshold, it is highly unlikely a court
would subsequently find action based on that belief to be in contra-
vention to either the Patriot Act or the Fourth Amendment.149
Another area in which the Patriot Act has generated a lot of contro-
versy is in its amendments to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act
(FISA). In 1978, the FISA created a narrow exception to the Fourth
Amendment probable cause requirement when the purpose of ob-
taining a wiretap was solely for gathering foreign intelligence. 50 The
rationale was to loosen the probable cause standard where the objec-
tive of the wiretap was not to gather evidence for trial. However,
there is nothing in the text of the Fourth Amendment that supports
this sort of exception. The Fourth Amendment prohibits not only un-
reasonable searches and seizures where the evidence is used in a trial,
but unreasonable searches and seizures in general. Even if there were
support for this rationale, the Patriot Act goes beyond this narrow
exception to allow for wiretaps and searches for the purpose of using
the information in domestic criminal cases.
146. See generally United States v. Yousef, 327 F.3d 56 (2d Cir. 2003) (recognizing the need
for governmental secrecy in investigating and responding to terrorist threats).
147. Richards v. Wisconsin, 520 U.S. 385 (1997) (stating the standard for executing a warrant
without the standard knock and announce is a "reasonable suspicion that knocking and an-
nouncing their presence, under the particular circumstances, would be dangerous or futile, or
that it would inhibit the effective investigation of the crime by, for example, allowing the de-
struction of evidence .... This showing is not high..."). Id. at 394.
148. Id. at 394-95.
149. See id. at 395.
150. See 50 U.S.C. § 1801(a)(4)-(5) (2006) (Originally, those groups subject to surveillance
under FISA were foreign powers, including groups engaged in international terrorism or activi-
ties in preparation thereof, and foreign-based political organizations not substantially composed
of United States persons.).
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Section 218 of the Patriot Act changes the scope for obtaining war-
rants and orders of surveillance under FISA.' 51 Prior to the passage
of the Patriot Act, FISA allowed for surveillance orders when the pur-
pose of the investigation was "foreign intelligence. ' 152 Under the Pa-
triot Act, warrants and orders of surveillance may be issued so long as
gathering foreign intelligence is "a significant purpose" of the investi-
gation.153 There is no explanation within the Patriot Act as to how
foreign intelligence would constitute a significant purpose within an
investigation. The definition section within the applicable portion of
the United States Code is also silent as to this question. 154 The only
guidance in this area was from brief statements made on the Senate
floor prior to the vote on the Patriot Act. For instance, Senator Di-
anne Feinstein said that:
In many cases, surveillance will have two key goals - the gathering of
foreign intelligence, and the gathering of evidence for a criminal pros-
ecution. Determining which purpose is the "primary" purpose of the
investigation can be difficult, and will only become more so as we co-
ordinate our intelligence and law enforcement efforts in the war
against terror.
Rather than forcing law enforcement to decide which purpose is pri-
mary - law enforcement or foreign intelligence gathering, this bill
strikes a new balance. It will now require that a "significant" purpose
of the investigation must be foreign intelligence gathering to proceed
with surveillance under FISA. The effect of this provision will be to
make it easier for law enforcement to obtain a FISA search or surveil-
lance warrant for those cases where the subject of the surveillance is
both a potential source of valuable intelligence and the potential tar-
get of a criminal prosecution. Many of the individuals involved in sup-
porting the September 11[th] attacks may well fall into both of these
categories.1 55
No matter how convincing Senator Feinstein and others appeared
during floor statements, one year later no one was applauding the
changes to FISA. In a statement before the Judiciary Committee,
Senator Leahy said that the change to require that foreign intelligence
be only a significant purpose of an investigation in which an order of
surveillance or warrant is sought did not mean the Fourth Amend-
ment standard of probable cause was being subverted.1 56 Senator
Leahy went on to say there was nothing in the text of the Patriot Act
151. Patriot Act § 218.
152. 50 U.S.C. § 1804(a)(7) (2006).
153. Patriot Act § 218.
154. See 50 U.S.C. § 1821 (2006).
155. 147 CONG. REC. S10547, S10591 (daily ed. Oct. 11, 2001) (statement of Sen. Feinstein).
156. The USA PATRIOT Act in Practice: Shedding Light on the F.LS.A. Process: Hearing
Before the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 107th Cong. (2002) (statement of Sen. Patrick J.
Leahy).
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to support the contention that information gathered in a FISA investi-
gation could be used in a criminal prosecution. 157
Even the government has been unable to articulate a workable defi-
nition when called on to defend the statute. In response to a chal-
lenge that the amendments to FISA were unconstitutional, the
government provided a "wholly benign interpretation" of the signifi-
cant purpose language. 58 The government simply stated that "the
'significant purpose' amendment recognizes the existence of the di-
chotomy between foreign intelligence and law enforcement, but it
contends that it cannot be said to recognize (or approve) [the] legiti-
macy [of the amendment].' 59
Since none of the typical legislative precautions were taken in pas-
sage of the Patriot Act, ample room is available to sidestep Fourth
Amendment protections. 6 ° Congress could have avoided the back
peddling it has done in subsequent discussions regarding the Patriot
Act had committee reports been filed or hearings held.'' Addition-
ally, Congress had at its disposal the legislative history from earlier
bills of similar context. For instance, when considering the Omnibus
Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, there was discussion of
whether the Act was expanding the constitutional powers of the exec-
utive to allow for domestic surveillance without warrant application:
Mr. HOLLAND.... The section [2511 (3)] from which the Senator
[Hart] has read does not affirmatively give any power .... We are not
affirmatively conferring any power upon the President. We are simply
saying that nothing herein shall limit such power as the President has
under the Constitution.... We certainly do not grant him a thing ....
There is nothing affirmative in this statement.
Mr. McCLELLAN. Mr. President, we make it understood that we are
not trying to take anything away from him.
Mr. HOLLAND. The Senator is correct.
Mr. HART. Mr. President, there is no intention here to expand by this
language a constitutional power. Clearly we could not do so.
Mr. McCLELLAN. Even though intended, we could not do so.
Mr. HART.... However, we are agreed that this language should not
be regarded as intending to grant any authority, including authority to
put a bug on, that the President does not have now .... In addition,
Mr. President, as I think our exchange makes clear, nothing in section
157. Id.
158. In re Sealed Case No. 02-001, 310 F.3d 717, 734 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (citing supplement
brief of the United States).
159. Id. at 734-35 (internal quotations omitted).
160. See 147 CONG. REC. H7159 (daily ed. Oct. 23, 2001) (No committee reports were filed
with the bill. No hearings were conducted. The only delay in passing the act was the vote to
suspend the rules in the House so that the bill could be put to an immediate vote.).
161. See generally The USA PATRIOT Act in Practice: Shedding Light on the ELS.A. Pro-
cess: Hearing Before the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 107th Cong. (2002).
2006]
23
Metzler: Providing Material Support to Violate the Constitution: The USA P
Published by History and Scholarship Digital Archives, 2006
58 NORTH CAROLINA CENTRAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 29:35
2511 (3) even attempts to define the limits of the President's national
security power under present law ..... Section 2511 (3) merely says
that if the President has such a power, then its exercise is in no way
affected by title 111.162
Congress also had case precedent at its disposal that interpreted the
Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act. The guidance found is
not necessarily in the Court's interpretation of the actual meaning of
the statute. Rather the instruction gleaned is in how the Court consid-
ered Congress would act in drafting such a sensitive piece of
legislation:
[I]t would have been incongruous for Congress to have legislated with
respect to the important and complex area of national security in a
single brief and nebulous paragraph. This would not comport with the
sensitivity of the problem involved or with the extraordinary care
Congress exercised in drafting other sections of the Act. We therefore
think the conclusion inescapable that Congress only intended to make
clear that the Act simply did not legislate with respect to national se-
curity surveillances. 16J
IV. THE TENSION BETWEEN THE PATRIOT ACT AND THE
FOURTH AMENDMENT
With safeguards and resources available, not to mention the U.S.
Constitution itself, Congress had no excuse for producing such a slop-
pily crafted piece of legislation. 1" This hastily drafted legislation pro-
vides law enforcement officials several techniques to avoid the Fourth
Amendment and in some cases to simply ignore it. Those techniques
are camouflaged nicely within the voluminous Patriot Act.
For instance, section 805 of the Patriot Act allows for the prosecu-
tion of individuals who provide material support to terrorists any-
where in the world.165 The statue simply criminalizes the conduct in a
manner similar to an aiding and abetting statute. However, these indi-
viduals are not charged as principals, as would be under an aiding and
abetting statute. 166 Also, in contrast to an aiding and abetting statute,
there is a question about the knowledge an individual allegedly pro-
viding material support must possess. In an aiding and abetting stat-
ute, the government must show that the "defendant willfully and
162. United States v. United States Dist. Ct., 407 U.S. 297, 306-07 (1972) (quoting Senate
hearings on PL 90-351(1968)).
163. Id. at 306.
164. Congress also had at its disposal the Offices of Legislative Counsel for House and Sen-
ate as well as the Congressional Research Service. Each of these offices exists to provide gui-
dance for and review of potential legislation.
165. See Patriot Act § 805 (Section 805 explicitly eliminated the requirement that the sup-
port be provided to terrorists "within the United States.").
166. See 18 U.S.C. § 2 (2005).
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knowingly associated himself with the unlawful venture and willfully
participated in it as he would in something he wishes to bring about or
to make succeed."'1 67 Yet, while the statute indicates that material
support must be provided with knowledge or intent that it will be used
in the preparation of or in the carrying out of a terrorist activity, 168 the
fact that the support does not have to be linked to any specific terror-
ist act directly contradicts that requirement. 169 These inconsistencies
lead to the conclusion that by itself providing material support is in-
sufficient to demonstrate criminal action. Rather, it is a piece of evi-
dence which suggests the individual may have aided and abetted in a
crime. This, however, would require a demonstration of probable
cause under a Fourth Amendment analysis.
Were material support simply a piece of evidence in an investiga-
tion, an officer would be required to show how the support is proof of
terrorist activity. Presumably, proof of material support would re-
quire more than the fact that an individual made a single donation to
(1) a group or (2) an individual who later carried out a terrorist act.
In the absence of a link between support and a crime, it would be
difficult to demonstrate probable cause for a search or arrest based on
material support. The problem lies within the definition of material
support, which is no definition at all. The statutory definition is sim-
ply a list of what types of items (or materials) can provide support. As
it stands, law enforcement officials may detain and charge suspects
with a crime even if there is no nexus between the support and the
crime, regardless of the size of the support. 1
70
Section 207 of the Patriot Act extends the time for surveillance
under FISA from 90 to 120 days, and it extends the time to execute a
search warrant under FISA from 45 to 90 days. This statute, com-
bined with the revisions in section 218, which allows for warrants
when foreign intelligence is a "significant purpose" of the search,
means a criminal investigation may ensue without any demonstration
of probable cause. Judges are not required to consider whether prob-
able cause of a crime exists when issuing a warrant under these provi-
sions. Judicial determination requires that judges issue a warrant so
long as the government can demonstrate a foreign power is involved
and that the property to be searched is used or possessed by a foreign
power. 171
167. United States v. Palmer, 604 F.2d 64, 76 (10th Cir. 1979) (emphasis added).
168. 18 U.S.C. § 2339A(a) (2006).
169. See discussion of section 805; See also Boim v. Quranic Literacy Inst., 291 F.3d 1000 (7th
Cir. 2002).
170. See discussion of section 805 supra note 165.
171. 50 U.S.C. § 1824 (a)(3)(A)-(B) (2006).
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The FISA warrant is nothing more than a statement of status of the
focus of the investigation. As previously indicated, no probable cause
regarding neither the commission of a crime nor the likelihood of the
commission of a crime is proven under FISA warrant. This powerful
instrument allows the government to obtain information that may sub-
sequently be used in any criminal prosecution as long as criminal pros-
ecution was not the sole purpose of obtaining the warrant. 72 As this
information is a warrantless acquisition, it will be reviewed as such.
The section of FISA amended by the Patriot Act meets none of the
standard exceptions to the warrant requirement that would otherwise
allow the information obtained under the FISA warrant to be admissi-
ble. No crime was committed in the presence of law enforcement offi-
cials. If that were the case, the government would simply seek a
standard search or arrest warrant. No exigent circumstances exist of
an impending crime or possible escape by a person of interest. In-
deed, there is no evidence that a crime will ever be committed or that
the person of interest is anything more than a tourist exists. Obvi-
ously, a Terry stop would not apply in the search of a residence. One
recent development in Fourth Amendment analysis allows for war-
rantless searches when special needs exist. It is a relaxed standard
that even allows for blanket searches of individuals using public
transportation.173
When measuring if a search is allowable based on special needs, the
court has said that "what is required is a fact-specific balancing of in-
trusion . . . against the promotion of legitimate governmental inter-
ests.' 1 74  In making this determination, courts consider "[1] the
character of the intrusion imposed by the [challenged conduct] ... [2]
the nature and immediacy of the [state's] concerns and [3] the efficacy
of the [governmental conduct] in meeting them.' '1 75
The character of the intrusion for a FISA warrant is as intrusive as
any warranted search; and while a FISA warrant requires a statement
of minimization, this simply requires the Attorney General to make a
reasonable attempt to avoid non-targeted information. 176
Second, the immediacy of the concern under FISA is the general
concern of a terrorist attack. This is not an attempt to diminish the
real possibility of a terrorist attack. But the Supreme Court made a
172. See In Re Sealed Case No. 02-001, 310 F.3d 717, 726 (2002) (discussing how evidence of
ordinary crimes is admissible when the information is inadvertently discovered or the crime is
inextricably linked to a terrorist act).
173. See Macwade v. Kelly, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 39695 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 7, 2005).
174. N.G. v. Connecticut, 382 F.3d 225, 231 (2d Cir. 2004) (quoting Bd. of Educ. v. Earls, 536
U.S. 822, 830 (2002)).
175. Bd. of Educ. v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822, 830-34 (2002).
176. See 50 U.S.C. § 1801(h) (2006).
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distinction in Illinois v. Lidster between conducting a search into gen-
eral crimes versus specific crimes.177 Though the Court's analysis was
a bit tortured, its basic premise is that warrantless searches are not
allowed when police are gathering information to help in crime pre-
vention rather than aiding in the resolution of a crime.' 78 Clearly,
with no evidence a crime has been or ever will be committed, a FISA
warrant falls under the former category.
Finally, the efficacy of the government's conduct would seem to
provide the greatest support for the FISA searches. However, even if
one concedes that point, what remains is an intrusive search that may
or may not produce evidence of a crime, which may or may not be a
crime of terrorism, but which definitely may be used in a criminal
prosecution - so long as that prosecution was not the primary purpose
of the search. It is the quintessential fishing expedition, which the
Fourth Amendment forbids. 1
79
A. The Long Term Effects
There is no question that the Patriot Act opens the door to Fourth
Amendment intrusions. The question is simply the nature of the
ramifications of those intrusions. One author describes the current
state of Fourth Amendment protections as being in flux, which is a
necessary response to the "mass murders" of September 11th.180 To
the extent that Congress has subverted the checks and balances of the
Constitution and eliminated judiciary oversight of the statutes
amended by the Patriot Act, the commentator's analysis rightly de-
scribes the current state of criminal procedure. However, if the com-
mentator's analysis is followed to its logical conclusion, the
equilibrium, the commentator claims may return, will actually remain
an elusive concept because the war on terrorism is ongoing. The
threats against society are ever-changing. The need to protect our-
selves is unending. Therefore, to restore equilibrium, the judiciary will
have to step in and make some tough decisions regarding the Patriot
Act.
It is only a matter of time before the Patriot Act becomes the basis
of our criminal law. This statement is true for two reasons. The first
reason is because of the manner in which state police agencies are
already employed to fight the war on terrorism.18' The second reason
177. See generally Illinois v. Lidster, 540 U.S. 419 (2004).
178. See Lidster, 540 U.S. at 427.
179. See Doe v. United States, 487 U.S. 201 (1988).
180. See William J. Stuntz, Local Policing After the Terror, 111 YALE L. J. 2137, 2142-43
(2002).
181. See MacWade v. Kelly, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 31281 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (discussing
Container Inspection Program implemented by the City of New York).
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is that the courts will make decisions that effect not only terrorism but
also domestic crimes. 182
State police agencies are the first line of defense against terrorism.
They are responsible for the day-to-day efforts of rooting out would-
be terrorists. They monitor subways, sporting events and even
schools. They conduct searches and investigate potential threats.
They are the daily presence the public sees as protecting their lives.
This reality combined with the need to improve relations between law
enforcement agencies provides the perfect environment for the Pa-
triot Act to thrive as "the" domestic criminal law. The Patriot Act has
already arranged the federal law enforcement agencies under one um-
brella. The federal government already provides funding to states to
enhance their DNA facilities and grants the states access to the fed-
eral DNA database.1 83 Additionally, the definition of domestic terror-
ism can apply to crimes that are historically state enforced offences.
Based on the broad powers granted under the Patriot Act and the
desire to improve the communication and cooperation between police
agencies, it is quite foreseeable that the Patriot Act (or a similar crea-
tion) could become the governing document for our nation's police
agencies.
The potential for abuse of constitutional protections by focused po-
lice efforts is heightened because of the technological advances such
as DNA testing, wiretapping, email and voicemail monitoring. The
law has never been written in such a way that considers how techno-
logical advances will affect the breadth of government intrusion.
Domestic crimes that are now run-of-the-mill criminal offenses
could easily fall under the purview of the Patriot Act, especially if
joint efforts between local and federal law enforcement agencies in-
crease. The Patriot Act added a definition of domestic terrorism to
the United States Code to include crimes that:
(A) involve acts dangerous to human life that are a violation of the
criminal laws of the United States or of any State;
(B) appear to be intended-
(i) to intimidate or coerce a civilian population;
(ii) to influence the policy of a government by intimidation or
coercion;
or
(iii) to affect the conduct of a government by mass destruction,
assassination, or kidnapping; and
182. See Stuntz, supra note 180, at 2140-41.
183. The National Institute of Justice administers the DNA Capacity Enhancement Program.
42 U.S.C. 14132 (2006) provides the scope of what agencies are allowed to receive assistances
under the program.
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(C) occur primarily within the territorial jurisdiction of the United
States. 8
The gangs that were the motivation behind the ordinance in Chi-
cago v. Morales would meet this definition. The gangs were said to be
"largely responsible for the city's rising murder rate, as well as an es-
calation of violent and drug related crimes... [and] the ... presence
of street gang members in public places has intimidated many law
abiding citizens." '185 Murders and drug crimes are obviously crimes
"dangerous to human life." '186 The City Council, with the assent of the
citizens, through the vote in favor of the ordinance, expressed a feel-
ing of intimidation.1 87 Finally, the events in Morales took place com-
pletely within the United States (the definition of domestic terrorism
only requires acts to occur primarily within the United States). Are
all gangs then to be labeled domestic terrorists groups? Are cities
such as Chicago and Los Angeles in danger of being placed under a
state of emergency because of wide-spread terrorist activity? Gangs
are not the only ones subject to prosecution as domestic terrorists.
Criminals such as the so-called Beltway Snipers who killed several
people in the Washington D.C. metropolitan area would also be sub-
ject to such prosecution. The Columbine High School shooting inci-
dent would also meet the definition of domestic terrorism. If these
acts are subsumed under the Patriot Act, they will be exposed to the
same Fourth Amendment violations as others within the scope of its
provisions.
B. Repairing the Patriot Act
Since the road from the Patriot Act is paved with unchecked gov-
ernmental intrusions on Fourth Amendment protections, what must
be done to fix the paving? The most obvious answer is to repeal the
Act and its provisions - which is the consummate act of throwing the
baby out with the bathwater. Therefore, less drastic measures are re-
quired. Those measures include (1) looking to the judiciary to identify
where the Patriot Act has run afoul of Fourth Amendment protec-
tions and (2) to apply the proper Fourth Amendment analysis to Pa-
triot Act provisions. Some restructuring of the Patriot Act is required
to eliminate potential abuses and to properly define terrorism.
184. 18 U.S.C. § 2331 (2006).
185. Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41, 46 (1999) (quoting City of Chicago v. Morales, 687
N.E.2d 53, 58 (I11. 1997)) (internal quotations omitted).
186. 18 U.S.C § 2331(A) (2006).
187. Morales, 527 U.S. at 46.
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When testifying regarding the power of the Justice Department to
enforce the provisions of the Patriot Act, former Attorney General
Ashcroft stated:
Congress's power of oversight is not without limits .... In some areas
... I cannot and will not consult you .... I cannot and will not divulge
the contents, the context, or even the existence of such advice to any-
one - including Congress - unless the President instructs me to do so. I
cannot and will not divulge information, nor do I believe that anyone
here would wish me to divulge information, that will damage the na-
tional security of the United States, the safety of its citizens or our
efforts to ensure the same in an ongoing investigation. 88
The problem inherent in that statement is the elimination of the
checks and balances provided for in the U.S. Constitution. Courts will
have to make a determination of the constitutionality of those prac-
tices. The Attorney General may take such a bold stance with no
oversight whatsoever. Indeed, during his statements in support of the
Patriot Act, Senator Leahy recognized that there were areas in which
the powers of the Executive Branch to enforce the act were unclear.
Speaking specifically in regards to FISA, Senator Leahy stated that "it
will be up to the courts to determine how far law enforcement agen-
cies may use FISA for criminal investigation and prosecution beyond
the scope of the statutory definition of 'foreign intelligence informa-
tion."" 89 One can only hope that the judiciary carries out that same
duty in regard to any of the Patriot Act provisions which grant broad
leeway to law enforcement officials and result in Fourth Amendment
violations.
Courts will also need to address the sections that bind their hands
and either force or preclude judicial action. No court should issue
warrants absent probable cause and demonstration that the warrant
meets recognized exceptions. This is not the time to give law enforce-
ment officials greater leeway; rather, it is time to reinforce the original
purpose of the Fourth Amendment, limiting government action.
The other necessary action is to amend the statutes that now allow
for the constitutional violations. Congress should reinstitute the re-
quirement that foreign intelligence be the primary purpose of surveil-
lance and warrants under FISA. Additionally, if Congress truly
wishes to criminalize material support, there needs to be a nexus be-
tween the support and the terrorist act as well as a clear demonstra-
188. DOJ Oversight: Preserving Our Freedoms While Defending Against Terrorism Before
the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 107th Cong. (2001) (Dec. 6, 2001) (written statement of the
Honorable John Ashcroft, Attorney General), available at: http://judiciary.senate.gov/print-
testimony.cfm?id= 121 &witid=42.
189. 147 Cong. Rec. S11004 (emphasis added) (statement of Associate Deputy Attorney
General Kris).
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tion of intent. This would allow the government to charge the
offender as a principal and it would also provide leverage in investiga-
tions of those actually carrying out the terrorist acts. The reasonable
belief standard for delaying notice of the execution of a warrant
should only be allowed when considered by a magistrate. The statute
should close the loophole created by Richards v. Wisconsin.190 Closing
this loophole would prevent abuse by unrestrained law enforcement
agencies.
Finally, Congress must correct the definition of "domestic terror-
ism" so that crimes typically enforced by the states do not rise to the
level of a terrorist act. In particular, the subsection that makes intimi-
dating the general population a terrorist act requires clarification.
What level of intimidation is necessary? Intimidation caused by gangs
loitering on a street corner is not equal to the nationwide intimidation
caused by the September 11th attacks. As the statute currently reads,
both are acts of terrorism.
V. CONCLUSION
In the aftermath of September 11th, the government had the unique
opportunity to extend its protection to the people within its borders.
The protection was not to take the form of armed soldiers quartered
in civilian homes nor was it to be a state of emergency that called for
curfews or encampments. The protection was to identify and stop
would-be terrorists from launching another assault against American
citizens. The government crafted the Patriot Act in response to that
need. Unfortunately, the practical application of the Patriot Act is not
the grand proposition first presented to the American public. That
sad reality coupled with the erosion of constitutional protections has
left the country more vulnerable than it was before the attacks.
Now, in the aftermath of a botched legislative effort, the govern-
ment once again has the opportunity to protect the people within its
borders. This time, however, the protection is not from an unknown,
external threat, but from our own government. This time, the physical
protection of the people should not be at the cost of their constitu-
tional protections.
190. See Richards v. Wisconsin, 520 U.S. 1154 (1997); see also supra discussion note 147.
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